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The effort of partnership: Capacity development and moral capital in partnership for 
mutual gains 
Abstract 
The article discusses the enactment of a strategic partnership undertaken by a large, 
multi-site company and several trade unions. The enterprise aimed to institute highly engaged 
practices of employee and management voice to create a collaborative culture throughout the 
organization. The study finds that five years since the inception of the project of institutional 
change considerable challenges to its embedding and effectiveness remain. It also finds that 
particular characteristics of the partnership propose resource generation for addressing those 
challenges and progressing collaborative relations to mutual benefit. Substantive actor effort 
and organizational learning generate capacity for new relationships. That includes activation 
of moral capital including toleration, patience, mutual respect, reciprocity, and trust. 
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Introduction 
A recurrent feature of company strategic initiative in liberal market economies is the 
undertaking of labour–management partnership relations. These occasional and persistent 
occurrences are undertaken, despite their well-known fragilities (Danford and Richardson, 
2016; Geary and Trif, 2011; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2017), for reasons typically to do with 
improving employment relationships and organizational life, and generating mutual gains. 
Research has elaborated on the many fissures, obstacles, tensions and challenges of 
partnership in its various guises, and analysed factors in their failure. Questions over how they 
are sustained over time are plentiful. Knowledge of the efforts required to navigate the 
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challenges of partnership and to craft aspirations into productive relations and concrete 
outcomes for mutual and distributed benefit remains sketchy. 
This article discusses an empirical study of an enterprise-level initiative to substantively 
reform industrial relations and organizational culture in a large corporation. The corporation, 
based in New Zealand, took an initiative to form, as declared by its charter, a ‘strategic 
partnership’ between the company and its major trade unions with intention to institute 
extensive and unprecedented practices of con-joint employee and management voice. The 
partnership undertaking aimed to forge institutional change, both of formal structures and 
normative habits, and create a ‘collaborative culture throughout the organization’.  
The article principally focuses on developments in the programme of institutional 
change five years after its inception. Its principal contribution to advancing debate in 
partnership and employee participation research fields is the identification of key 
characteristics of the enactment of the partnership. Those characteristics, in addition to robust 
formal structures for employee and management participation, are the qualitative resources of 
actor effort to generate capacity through developing new skills and activating moral capital 
(including toleration, patience, mutuality, and trust). Corporate (management and labour) 
learning, actor relational and identity shifts, and deployed moral capital generate new 
collective capacities. These propose substantive resources to embed institutional change, both 
formal and normative, and sustain and evolve the partnership over time. The article is 
structured as follows: we review key debates on partnership and collaboration, outline the 
particular case context, and describe the empirical study. We then discuss its findings and 
analysis. Further remarks are made in conclusion. 
Partnership debates 
Efforts to pursue labour–management collaboration or partnership relations in Anglo-
American countries have been observed over many decades (Blumberg, 1968; Lansbury, 
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1980; Ramsay, 1977). A distinct turn toward partnership undertakings occurred in the 1980s 
and 1990s that sought a ‘high road’, of ‘high involvement’ and ‘high performance’ 
management and employee practices that would promote an organizational culture of 
‘continuous improvement’ (Boxall and Macky, 2009; Godard, 2004; Ramsay, Scholarios and 
Harley, 2000; Wood, 2010) and produce diverse benefits for employees and companies. The 
collaborative and high performance approach to company-level management and employee 
relations grew out of recognition of ‘mutual gains’ that were afforded by developments in 
post-Fordist, advanced technological and production systems (Batt, 2004; Kochan and 
Osterman, 1994; Kochan et al. 2009; Patmore and Golan, 2003). These post-Fordist, less rigid 
production systems potentially required, or enabled, more collaborative team-working among 
workers and management (Heckscher, 1988; Hirschhorn, 1988; Wallace, 1989). 
These promising prospects in the 1990s for the mutual gains of improved employment 
relations, high performance work practices, more congenial organizations, and productivity 
benefits resulted in mixed outcomes. Some found that mutual benefits include improved 
company productivity and performance, greater job security, and improved trust between 
management and employees (Bray, Macneil and Stewart, 2017; Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Brooks, 
Mulloy, 2015; Glover, Tregaskis and Butler, 2014). Critics pointed to disappointing results 
that question claims to superior outcomes of high performance systems for workers 
(Badigannavar and Kelly, 2011; Godard, 2004; Thompson and van den Broek, 2010). 
Nonetheless, the notion of high performance systems continues to influence recurrent efforts 
among company and labour actors to embark on projects of formalized partnership relations 
for mutual benefits. 
Partnership essentially recognizes shared areas of interests among the parties in addition 
to conflicting interests. The concept generally conveys, at minimum, a sense of mutual 
legitimation, commitment to cooperative process, consultation, and participation. Ventures in 
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partnership relationships range from modest expressions of cooperation, consultation and 
information sharing, to employee stock options, and provision for degrees of co-participation 
in high level decision-making (Ackers and Payne, 1998, Appelbaum and Hunter, 2005; 
Danford, Richardson, Stewart, Tailby and Upchurch, 2005; Kochan et al. 2009). Partnership 
is widely acknowledged to be difficult to sustain. Researchers point to their ‘potential and 
precariousness’ (Kochan et al. 2008) and document successes, failures and mutations of 
partnerships (Johnstone et al. 2009; Kochan et al. 2009; Stuart and Martinez Lucio, 2005; 
Townsend et al. 2014). Researchers find some partnerships ‘resilient’ (Butler et al., 2011) and 
of ‘substantive benefit’ to companies, management, unions, and employees (Geary and Triff 
2011; Johnstone, 2015; Kochan, 2016).  
Partnerships may enable unions to advance their institutional centrality and legitimacy 
claims for industrial democracy and collaborative participation (Ackers and Payne, 1998; 
Haynes and Allen, 2001). They may forge a ‘modernisation’ of employment relations to 
include integration of labour into employer decision-making processes (Deakin, Hobbs, 
Konzelmann, and Wilkinson, 2005; Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009; Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 
2002). Partnerships may be depicted on a spectrum of ‘robust’ to ‘shallow’ (Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2002) in which variable outcomes are dependent on multiple factors in company-
specific configurations (Deakin, et al., 2005; Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009; Johnstone and 
Wilkinson, 2017). Johnstone and Wilkinson’s (2017) longitudinal study documents factors 
that assist partnership durability even in the highly liberalized and financialized economy of 
the UK. In addition to favourable conditions, those factors notably include ‘strong informal 
relations’ between union and management actors and recognition of union legitimacy. 
Still others conclude that partnerships ‘cannot work’ (Danford and Richardson, 2016) 
and mutual gains are ‘an illusion and figment of aspirational theoretical imagination’ 
(Dobbins and Dundon, 2017, p. 520). Partnership, some contend, is a project of HRM that 
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integrates employees into management controlled strategies and exploits their willingness to 
express voice (Taylor and Ramsay, 1998; Danford, et al., 2005). For labour interests, many 
see little prospect for partnership efforts beyond a ‘faithless realism’ (Stuart and Martinez 
Lucio, 2005) of reluctant compliance with a managerial overture to a co-opted partnership 
that is of more benefit to employers than employees (Guest and Peccei, 2001). Some regard 
partnerships in the UK as ‘substantially hollow’ and ‘procedurally biased’ (Samuel and 
Bacon, 2010) in large part due to a low trust culture. Some researchers advocate instead for 
re-invigorated trade unions and muscular industrial relations (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2011; 
Getman, 2010). 
Others note that even where conditions are more favourable to partnership undertakings, 
favourable winds are not enough. Cooperative relations for mutual benefit, researchers note, 
take effort (Bélanger and Edwards 2007; Geary and Triff, 2011), although what comprises 
that effort is left unsaid. Likewise, some researchers highlight the important role of the 
‘quality of relations’ between parties in making partnerships work (Geary and Triff, 2011; 
Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2017), with little elaboration about specific qualities, how they are 
developed, and what they yield. Some researchers argue that cooperative relations are most 
robust when a pluralist approach is recognized and respected. Specifically, when a neo-
pluralist (Ackers, 2014) or collaborative pluralist (Bray, Budd and Macneil, 2015) approach is 
adopted, all parties recognize mutual legitimacy and conflicting interests. Parties take 
responsibility for addressing each other’s interests and seek to find common ground and 
common interests (Bray et al., 2017). 
The New Zealand context  
In New Zealand, a long history of periodic efforts for forms of industrial democracy 
and employee participation has resulted in various arrangements. Building on earlier efforts 
for industrial conflict resolution, notably compulsory industrial arbitration and conciliation 
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(Barry and Wailes, 2004) and workers’ rights (that include New Zealand’s early introduction 
of the 40-hour week in 1935) notable developments include efforts for works councils and 
joint consultative committees alongside collective bargaining (Boxall et al., 2007; Haynes, 
Marchington, Boxall, 2007; Rasmussen, 2009). A 1989 Inquiry into Industrial Democracy in 
New Zealand recommended introduction of formal works councils for companies employing 
40 or more workers. That formal institutionalisation did not occur but voluntary participatory 
arrangements have been officially encouraged by successive governments over decades 
(Rasmussen, 2009). Recent health and safety at work legislation places a duty on non-exempt 
employers to implement practices of worker participation with respect to health and safety 
(Farr, Laird, Lamm and Bensemann, 2019). A number of employers and unions have 
endeavoured to institute substantive employee participation in organization decision-making. 
But trade unions have typically favoured collective bargaining as the predominant form of 
industrial participation. 
 New Zealand companies are relatively small with few multi-divisional operations. A 
majority of workplaces practice forms of joint consultation arrangements typically known as 
joint consultation committees (Boxall et al., 2007). Workplace reform that includes labour–
management partnership undertakings have periodically been promoted by government 
programmes (Delaney and Haworth, 2016; Haynes and Allen, 2001; Macneil et al., 2011). 
Partnership undertakings have utilized elements of productivity bargaining and workplace 
modernization prominent in the US partnership model while at the same time exhibiting 
features of the ‘social partnership’ concept advocated in many European countries in which 
unions are recognized as contributing to the social regulation of labour markets (Huzzard et 
al, 2004; Macneil et al. 2011). These undertakings have resulted, as elsewhere, in a mixture of 
successful interventions as well as persistent problems in their consolidation (Haynes et al., 
2005; McAndrew et al., 2010). McAndrew (2006) finds that where collective bargaining 
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relationships are respected and ‘mature’ partnership relations with employees, unions and 
firms are more likely to be successful. Delaney and Haworth (2016) find, that despite the 
persistent recurrence of partnership efforts in New Zealand, they generally end in failure, 
overcome by the ‘bleak environment’ of their macro-political context. Nonetheless, labour–
management partnership undertakings, which are costly at inception, persist in New Zealand. 
Research context  
We undertook a field study from late 2016 to mid-2018 of a New Zealand company that 
has entered into a formal partnership between management and trade unions. The company, 
which we refer to as Company A, operates in the transportation and freight sectors and trades 
in a global market. The company has been in operation for many decades and employs over 
10,000 workers. Four unions represent over 70% of the workforce, and in some areas of the 
business nearly all employees are union members. Collective bargaining is widely accepted 
and commonplace. In earlier decades, prior to the sweep of neo-liberal reforms in the 1980s in 
New Zealand, the company had a more engaged and participatory style (including union 
representatives on executive committees and the company board).  But the intervening 
decades had been marked by strife and conflict. After a prolonged period of industrial 
conflict, in 2013 the company and unions agreed to embark on a path toward ‘strategic 
partnership’ that entailed a programme of institutional reform throughout the organization. A 
new CEO, familiar with US partnership efforts, sought a new industrial relations orientation 
in the company.  
Company documents report that management’s approach to decision making prior to the 
partnership venture was unilateral with little meaningful employee involvement. Its style was 
to ‘control rather than collaborate with employees’ (Internal case study document).  The 
company reported that it was poised to ‘take advantage of favourable market conditions’ but it 
was ‘restricted by the deteriorating employment relationships’. Company leaders declared 
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their desire for new ways of working with their workforce and changes to their conventional 
employment relations practices. Key union actors expressed their fatigue with adversarial 
relations and wished to experiment with more effective forms of influence.  
With the assistance of consultants who have previously worked on the Kaiser 
Permanente Labour Management Partnership (see Kochan et al, 2009 and Kochan, 2016 for 
detail), the company and unions agreed to ‘collaborate on how to collaborate’. In 2015, senior 
executives and union leaders of the four largest unions signed a charter that formally outlines 
the vision, objectives, and governance structure of the partnership intended to ‘achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes’. We use the pseudonym ‘HIP’ (high involvement and 
performance) to signify the particular partnership undertaking. 
The parties agreed to a number of aspirations including ‘meaningful employee 
involvement’ in substantive problems and decisions, using interest-based problem solving 
rather than adversarial processes for disputes and disagreements, creating an environment of 
trust based on transparency, and that the company ‘respects and supports the role(s) of unions 
in the workplace’. The charter lists a number of ‘equally important’ objectives that the 
company and the unions are jointly committed to developing, such as superior productivity, 
shareholder value, competitive position, superior wages, security and conditions, training and 
development, and health and safety. A new joint governance structure was introduced in order 
to provide a strong foundation to implement and sustain the necessary structural and 
behavioural changes. The company established a distinct ER function tasked with creating a 
more relational approach toward employees and unions. 
The new structure established several layers of teams and working groups to provide 
respective governance, leadership, involvement and implementation functions of HIP across 
the company’s business units. Senior union and company leaders, as well as middle managers, 
union delegates and front line employees are represented in the new governance structure. 
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The joint structure aims to popularize the concept of collaborative partnership among former 
adversaries, to involve a majority of occupational groups in problem-solving, and to disperse 
their newly conjoint decisions on reforms and innovations through the company. By mid-2018 
more than 200 issues have been addressed through HIP joint forums and agreement reached 
on resolutions. These range from regional restructuring, new operations systems, and 
technological developments, to work shift scheduling, health and safety initiatives, 
remuneration, and workload allocation. The partnership appears to be holding. Therefore, 
what are the key factors in its development and sustainability?  
Research design 
The qualitative field study, undertaken over eighteen months in 2016 through 2018, 
utilised participant observation, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The 
second author attended on-site team meetings and training events as well as off-site 
dissemination events. We interviewed a total of 43 participants including company managers 
(N = 10), trade union leaders and workplace actors (N = 26), and political actors and 
consultants (N = 7) involved in developing and enacting the partnership and HIP. Several key 
company, union and consultant actors were interviewed both formally and informally on 
multiple occasions. We studied company and trade union documents including the partnership 
charter, review reports, presentations, training materials, press releases, newsletters, annual 
reports, and media reports.  Interview questions were tailored for the respondent groups. Most 
people in the company refer to the partnership undertaking simply as ‘HIP’. We therefore 
used that term in our interviews and conversations.  We sought responses oriented on general 
questions: How is the HIP intervention being enacted/ working out? What are the main 
outcomes? What are the key challenges and tensions? Where are things headed? Interviews 
were typically of 60 minutes duration, and were audio-recorded and transcribed. 
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Both authors read and coded the data based on the guiding research interest framing this 
inquiry. After multiple iterations of reading and discussing the data we identified themes and 
proceeded to collate the data based on these. We note first that respondents reported numerous 
tensions, obstacles and frustrations, along with accomplishments, learnings and aspirations in 
the practical enactment of the institutional reform venture. We were especially interested in 
how actors responded to persistent challenges and exasperations. A first phenomenon we 
identified from the data was that of actors’ effort to forge an effective, concrete partnership. 
We focus particularly on the direction and application of that effort which we identify as the 
theme of capacity development. The second theme is the activation of the resource of moral 
capital.  
 Empirical findings 
We state first a summary paragraph of reported generally agreed accomplishments. 
Managers, union representatives, employees, and company consultants reported a set of 
significant initial outcomes of the HIP intervention within its first five years. Most notably 
these are: mutual recognition and legitimacy of conflicting as well as common interests, 
cessation of industrial conflict, established substantive forums for dialogue, promotion of 
mutual learning, and the recognition and distribution of the value of mutual gains. The unions 
reported benefits of halted outsourcing, improved job security, more management respect, and 
more ability to influence managerial decisions. Management actors reported immediate 
improvement in company actors’ perception of union rights and value, and recognition of the 
employees and unions as partners in the enterprise. Actors report a shift in the organization’s 
culture from ‘fighting, bossing, and grievance’ to one of more listening, joint problem-
solving, and cooperation. The company reports commercial value in examples of improved 
customer satisfaction, waste reduction, efficiency improvements, and social reputation. 
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In the course of these accomplishments, which retain fragilities and uncertainties, 
there were and remain considerable obstacles, tensions and challenges. The following section 
is principally a descriptive depiction of difficulties. This picture enables the in-depth 
discussion of the analytical themes that follows. 
 
1. Tensions, difficulties and challenges 
Parties report scepticism, mistrust, wariness and risk. A non-company political actor 
recalls that managers who had ‘been on the other side when the industrial strike frequency 
was high, were obviously sceptical at the beginning’ (Political actor #2).  The unions similarly 
report reservation: ‘We had union lawyers saying don’t get into this. Don’t do it ... There was 
mistrust absolutely everywhere’ (Union actor # 20). We focus first on union actors’ responses 
to tensions and challenges, and then those of management.  
Union actors report significant challenges in regard to management, other unions, and 
union members. A set of historical and habituated tensions within and between occupational 
unions within the partnership presented labour actors with a distinct challenge. Historical 
tensions between the larger and smaller unions of occupational groups whose interests are 
variously divergent have marked inter-union relations. A union leader reported: ‘Entering into 
this sort of collaborative model is a minefield. The bigger union tends to set the pace. The 
employer deals with the bigger union because they represent more employees’ (Union actor 
#2). Another adds: ‘There is competitive unionism and that’s not likely to go away.  That’s 
just the reality. But in HIP we’ve all agreed to work collaboratively’ (Union actor #3). 
Union actors report that working with other unions and company actors on HIP 
working groups has led to recognition of shared interests across occupational and divisional 
groups. Observable tensions and divergence remain between union members and union 
leaders who are highly engaged in the practicalities of the HIP processes. Traditional 
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adversarial relations and behavioural expectations continue to influence attitudes and 
behaviour. A union organiser described a traditional ‘mind-set’ among his members: ‘They 
are quite a cynical bunch.  To this day, they say HIP was just used to cull numbers… They 
thought we’re in the boss’s back pocket…They didn’t like the way that we were trying to work 
together.’ (Union actor #4). Another union organiser reports on member perceptions: ‘It’s 
really a fine line to keep your credibility with both parties…It’s easier to show that you’re 
fighting …that you’re doing the hard battles.  They don’t see the quietness of us working 
together on [an issue] and where we can create more value and more productivity so we have 
a better outcome [for workers].’ (Union actor #5).  
Union actors report their perceptions of mixed behaviour among managers in regard to 
enacting HIP processes. These include their critical concerns that: ‘There are a lot of 
managers that just see HIP as a means to achieving their bottom line … It’s all about 
efficiency and cost neutrality’. (Union actor # 8). They reported continuing conflicts notably 
in some business units and occupational groups of traditional management–union relations: 
‘We’ve had a few brush ups [tense interactions]’ (Union actor #9).  
A delegate reported on a conflictual set of issues that were put into the HIP process: 
‘Managers can be quite deceitful and try to manipulate the process to achieve an outcome 
they want. When we were in opposition to [issue X], management tried to shut down the 
group. They would absent themselves or be unavailable for the group meetings’ (Union actor 
#12). At the same time, in addition to these illustrations of continuing conflicts, traditional 
attitudes and historical habits, union actors report that ‘there are  managers that  have listened 
to people, taken on their concerns and then actually acted on it. . . [Managers] who make you 
feel that you are on a  level playing field, that it’s not manager versus staff member’ (Union 
actor #15). There remain significant levels of misunderstanding of what the company’s 
partnership and HIP is about. ‘If you go back to the old days of what were called partnership 
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models.  It was secretive. Union bosses, you know, being mates with the employer bosses, and 
the workers got screwed’ (Union actor #23). 
Managers similarly remarked on the legacy of tensions and habitual attitudes. A senior 
manager reported that prior to the partnership undertaking ‘the concept of creating a strategic 
partnership with unions was anathema; we didn’t even know what it was. They were alien to 
us…’ (Management actor # 9). Managers, too, carry traditional identities, behaviours, and 
norm expectations among themselves and in relation to unions. These affect the practicalities 
of communicating and enacting HIP practices in the everyday organizational life of company 
operations across multiple sites. They report a tendency for managers to blame other 
managers for the obstacles to implementing HIP and utilising its gains. One reports: ‘There 
are some general managers that will let it go down the path and then they hit a wall, and they 
just can’t collaborate anymore.  They pull back and say no, we’re not doing this.’ 
(Management actor #10).  
Some middle managers in business units feel tasked with key performance indicators 
(KPIs) that they would prefer to achieve by avoiding the time-taking HIP processes if they 
can. A consultant observes that an HIP session ‘will come undone because somebody is 
focused on efficiency, compliance, speed or cost’ (External consultant #3). A manager reports 
that for some colleagues ‘past experiences have left a bad taste in your mouth’ (Management 
actor #18). Others noted common organizational behaviours of individuals endeavouring to 
utilise institutional changes for their own advantages. Some managers ‘have got their own 
agenda, or they want a promotion and they’ll say, how does this benefit me?’ (Management 
actor #1). They use HIP forums to gain personally favourable outcomes.  
Both parties report on the tensions of gaining and sustaining personnel commitment to 
HIP, especially for staff who aren’t provided with workload release incentives to participate 
in activities that are ‘on top of my day job’ (Management actor #2). These fragilities affect the 
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shaping and embedding of HIP institutions across the company. A further vulnerability factor 
occurs in the continuing unevenness of dispersion of HIP practices and behaviours through 
the company. Senior managers report: ‘A lot of people haven’t touched HIP yet’ 
(Management actor #4) and: ‘There are some senior people who haven’t got on board [with 
HIP].  And we’re years down the track…’ (Management actor #10). 
Uneven dispersion and perceptions among some personnel of their business unit or 
group being left out of HIP initiatives generates tensions between the apparently ‘more 
privileged’ participants. Some occupational and business units, who are wary of HIP, find 
ways to engage at arm’s length only. Union actors reported similar concerns in regard to gaps 
in knowledge and experience across the company: ‘What we've got at the moment is, 
managers right at the top who understand HIP, and are pushing for it, and the union 
delegates who have been involved in HIP so they know more than the middle managers. But 
they also know more than the members.  So you've got holes, gaps… How do you get 
employees on the shop floor engaged?’ (Union actor #16). Some union delegates reported a 
sentiment amongst their peers that while the ‘higher ups [managers and union leaders]’ are 
‘enthused’ and ‘invested’ in HIP, front line workers are much less convinced that HIP is 
leading to tangible improvements in their working lives. Company managers recognise that 
HIP needs to be ‘more meaningful for unions and the workforce’ and to ‘include all workers 
every day’ (Management actor #9) across the company. 
Fragilities arising from uneven familiarity with and use of HIP collaborative problem 
recognition and resolution, as well as its avoidance by some managers and employees, 
generate tenuousness of commitment, and risk of more and less advantaged employees in 
regard to participatory and collaborative processes and benefits. Variable development and 
intra-middle management tensions across business units and geographic regions present 
considerable challenges to sustaining the partnership. Nonetheless, respondents across the 
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company report continuing interest and commitment to enacting and embedding the 
partnership undertaking.  No-one wants to ‘go back to the bad old days’ (Union actor #8). 
One union organiser emphasises that ‘we want to make sure that it [partnership] is done as 
well as we can possibly do it’, even if it may ‘take years’ (Union actor #20). 
 
2. Capability and capacity development  
The HIP initiation among company and union leaders declared and promoted mutual 
recognition and legitimacy of parties. The steps from mutual recognition of interests to 
enacting mutual, collaborative engagement require substantive new learning among multiple 
organizational actors. It requires actor capability development and collective organizational 
capacity development. The data reveals that the institutional change toward a collaborative 
culture is a continually learned, in situ, craft. It is not a spontaneous learning; it requires 
effort: ‘the pure hard grunt of it’ (Union actor #6). Actors report diverse learnings from how 
‘to get my head around this’ (Management actor #7) to collaborative analysis ‘of what’s going 
on in Hong Kong [division]…’ (Union actor #15). 
They report their learning of a range of new skills. We focus here on social-cognitive 
learning and the capacity development enabled by facilitating expertise recognition and 
exchange. Actors report that the skills and competences parties need to participate in 
collaborative and partnership forums are more sophisticated than the skill sets required of 
more traditional union and management relations. These extend from communication skills to 
developing strategic thinking. Respondents reported that delegates to HIP forums needed 
basic skills to speak confidently especially to management actors sharing the table: ‘to make 
an HIP workgroup successfully, you need to have people who aren’t afraid to challenge the 
way things are done’ (Management actor #6). For many employees, that competence requires 
active learning and encouragement. ‘A member in my current group was quite shy, reserved, 
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and fearful of voicing his opinion in front of management. It’s been great to see his transition’ 
(Union actor #21). They reported learning to see various aspects of an issue and understand 
consequences of proposals or interventions. 
Managers recognized the need for participatory skill development among personnel. 
‘We realized that our delegates needed help. If we’re going to ask them to have a seat at the 
table, we need to be able to provide tools and skills for them to do that’ (Management actor 
#5). Various training sessions continue to be provided including through the use of external 
consultants. All new recruits are given training in HIP, typically of two-days duration.  
Respondents report that inclusion of workers closely involved in various company 
operations in decision-making adds to knowledge resources, skilled expertise application, and 
knowledge dispersion: ‘the workers [on site] know how the processes work or not because 
they’re working on them each day.  They have all this institutional knowledge built up’ 
(Union actor #13). The HIP involvement facilitates the ‘breaking through’ of that expertise to 
inform decisions on productivity objectives as well as operational and work scheduling issues.  
An employee delegate remarks: ‘being on these HIP working parties, your mind grows 
and you develop interest’ (Union actor #9). They reported interest in developing strategic 
awareness of ‘what’s going on in the company’. Union organisers remarked that their 
involvement in substantive decision-making processes demanded that they had ‘to step up for 
it’. ‘It’s quite a different capability set; an ability to strategically analyse situations and 
understand complex issues (Union actor #21). ‘I think that’s how we build that platform to 
say, you know, we’re a serious, genuine, switched on partner here’ (Union actor #15). At the 
same time, as a union organiser described it, the vast ‘asymmetry of resource, knowledge and 
capability’ between unions and the company, which meant the union ‘couldn’t keep up with 
the company’s HIP goals and projects’ results in many ‘conflicts and frustrations’ between 
the two parties’ (Union actor #5). 
17 
 
Parties recognized the need for greater sharing and disclosure of information that was 
previously withheld. To facilitate and build collaborative relations personnel sharing in 
addition to knowledge expertise sharing as illustrated above is required. Actors report union 
and management information sharing behaviours, including the sharing of commercially 
sensitive financial information, forecasting models, data analysis procedures, future plans and 
anticipated problems. That involves, in the first instance, risk to management parties normally 
accustomed to guardedness and control of information in the presence of labour actors. 
Likewise, union actors must learn appropriate handling of company information. A delegate 
reported that she accepted that ‘there’s always going to be no-go zones for a business reason’ 
(Union actor # 28). The union, she states, accepts reasonable transparency on such issues.  
All parties agree that disagreement is evidence of a ‘robust’ and ‘diverse’ partnership 
but emphasise the need to disagree in a mature and respectful manner. As one union organiser 
describes ‘you disagree with people and you’re strong in your opinions, but you don’t let it 
get personal. And you keep the lines of communication open all the time. You might be 
disagreeing about one thing and threatening [something else]. But then you’ll move onto the 
next topic in the conversation and be agreeing.’ (Union actor, #24). The collective valuing of 
the partnership means that during an ongoing disagreement peers from union and 
management will call the involved parties and ‘tell them to cool off; give them some good 
advice on how to approach it’ (Union actor #24). 
A manager illustrates in speaking about some issues that were ‘behind the scenes, a 
very big elephant in the room’ and in and HIP working group. ‘We broke down those 
obstacles and discussed them with union executives and members and then the company 
[executives].  We were then able to move forward. We identified the blockage and worked 
around it’ (Management actor #4). In HIP groups where such trust hasn’t been developed, the 
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process is ultimately stalled with ‘everyone strategizing or thinking about what information 
the other party may be withholding’ (Union actor #21). 
The efforts and learnings depicted here comprise the development of social and 
cognitive capabilities that enable capacity development for the partnership to be practically 
enacted throughout the company. Formerly adversarial actors learn skills and competencies to 
become partners and co-construct their particular organizational partnership. In addition, and 
lubricating that social capital, is the activation of moral capital. 
3. Moral capital activation 
Actors report they have learned how to ‘disagree without being disagreeable’, to not 
‘let past experiences tarnish future endeavours’, to ‘deal with the fear that [we] might lose,’ 
to ‘give something back in return to maintain the relationship…’ to let inter-union conflicts 
‘start to disappear’ and that the labour–management partnership relationship ‘takes a lot of 
time’ to work out. These learnings entail more than social-cognitive application of knowledge 
resources to the effort to build partnership. They entail activation of the latent resource of 
moral capital. That includes toleration, patience, mutual respect and, not least, trust. 
Employee trust in management is positively affected by employee voice practices (Holland, 
Cooper, Pyman, and Teicher, 2012). But mutual trust requires improved management trust in 
labour partners along with respect for their representative roles. Actors, both labour and 
management, report their putting up with uncertainty and ambiguity, their patience with 
frustrations and perseverance with obstacles. They report shifts of identity prejudices and 
chauvinism to altered recognition of others and the complexity of the organization in which 
they are employed. They also report their shift from mistrust to trust, from withholding to 
sharing.  
None of these expressions and shifts comes easily to most people in an industrial 
context noted for historical aggravation and intransigence. A manager reports: ‘Everyone said 
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we do want it [the former status quo] to change’. But the company realised it had to take the 
first steps because the unions said ‘we’ve been battered and bruised for quite a long time so 
you guys have to show you’ve got [the wherewithal]. It was all a bit scary.’ (Management 
actor #9).  
As well as fear of the risk-taking, cross-party actors report the need to tolerate 
frustration with expectations and confusion, as one union leader describes: ‘there’s 
frustration… we went into this thinking we could achieve X, Y, Z. But it’s so slow with [those] 
guys and we can’t get what we want’ (Union actor #3). He elaborates on a particular situation 
in which ‘People got quite agitated and upset [about X] and we had to say hold on…We’re 
just going to have to work through this. It’s a long march.’ (Union actor #3). Developing the 
collective stamina and endurance to work through frustrations and obstacles, as well as having 
a longer term commitment to the relationship, is an important resource to develop within and 
between parties.  
Cross-party actors admit to initial scepticisms and judgements about each other. A 
senior manager reports his misrecognition of trade unions and suspicion of their legitimacy. 
He reflected that before the launch of the partnership undertaking that: ‘We didn’t give a 
damn about the unions. We showed no empathy to them, we didn’t understand where they 
were coming from.’ He reports that on working with a senior union leader he discovered ‘it 
was like talking to another senior leader in an organisation and then, all of a sudden, I had to 
get to know [more about partnering with unions]’ (Management actor #9). A union leader 
reports an illustration of that shift bearing fruit in respect and mutuality that had not 
previously occurred in his thirty years of experience: ‘No [executive] has ever sent me the 
types of emails that [X] has sent just to say, ‘pretty impressed with what you guys did on that’ 
(Union actor #3). Another union leader describes ongoing formal and informal conversations 
with senior company officers about expansive and complex issues ‘like the future of work’, 
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and cites an instance when senior company executives ‘gave us an hour and a half of their 
time just to listen to the union…what our challenges are… That would never happen [prior to 
HIP], they would’ve just said ‘why waste our day?’ (Union actor #15). Such instances are 
suggestive of an openness to mutual learning and influencing that has been created through 
the partnership.  
Cross-party respondents recognized that trust is a core element of their partnership. 
They reported their efforts to generate it. For a union actor, ‘Sharing information, agreeing to 
disagree… When I'm right and you're wrong, that doesn't work; that’s a barrier.  But …then 
you try and find ways to get closer’ (Management actor #4). A senior manager reports that in 
order to engage in relationship change with the aim of mutual transparency and sharing of 
operational and strategic content he needed to go beyond information disclosure. Building 
trust required more than rational exchange. He reports that he realized he needed to make 
‘some apologies on behalf of management [to unions and employees]. We realised that we’d 
been harsh and our leadership style had been unfair. We had to take responsibility for the fact 
that we had damaged relationships’ (Management actor #9). Likewise, a union organiser 
describes a trust-building occasion through his disclosure to the HIP leadership team that the 
union movement is actively wrestling with conflicting philosophies about the future of 
unionism, especially with regard to inter- and intra- union conflicts about engaging in 
partnership relationships.  
Participants state that the vulnerability of such disclosures, while experienced as risk 
and criticised by some, is vital to building trust in the partnership. The risk-taking in sharing 
has subsequently fostered greater trust among parties that has opened paths to further 
development. It builds capability of understanding and mutual recognition. As one delegate 
reports, ‘When they’re open with you with information and they actually say to you in an 
honest environment ‘this is the problem for us, if you do that’, I can look at both sides now’ 
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(Union actor #14). A union delegate reported an example of improved relationship 
connections and trust that had occurred through working on HIP committees that had a spill-
over effect for other (non-HIP) matters. An employee ‘was going through a disciplinary 
procedure. I rang up the manager and I said, hey look, can you give me a feel for this? And 
she [explained]. Several years ago that would have been unheard of’ (Union actor #23). 
That illustration of new trust between the parties indicates the role of that resource in 
drawing out of rich tacit knowledge among the parties for application to finding mutually 
agreeable solutions to organizational and employment relations problems. Senior managers 
and union officials are observed and reported to engage in collective reflection on the state of 
the partnership relationship and seek behavioural adjustments to evolve the relationship. 
Trustful interactions and co-participation in forums to address issues also enables identity 
expansiveness and agility. A delegate reflects on her opening up: ‘the first thing I used to say 
was no, no, no!... Now I’m a lot less combative.’ Among her first learnings was to become 
more ‘appreciative’ in her relationships. ‘I’m a lot more understanding of the organization’. It 
has made me realise that we – especially our [occupational] group of people – we’re very 
stuck in the past.’ (Union actor #11). 
In the process of practising these all-party competencies, actors undergo a shift and 
expansion of their traditional organizational identities, and an ability to move between 
multiple identities. Respondents speak of: ‘I’m a different sort of person now…’ ‘I see things 
differently now’, ‘we’re all employees…’ and, ‘‘it’s no longer them and us’. Union organisers 
in particular spoke of ‘taking one hat off and putting another hat on’ (Union actor #23) in 
their work, particularly when they moved between activities, or between non-partnership 
companies. The role of an organiser in collaborative efforts expands to include the traditional 
‘advocate’ role and also ‘facilitator’, ‘mediator’ and ‘problem-solver’ roles. The organisers 
are well aware of the ‘fine lines’ that become ‘a lot more blurred with HIP’ (Union actor 
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#22), as they try to represent their members and advance organisational processes. For 
example, one organiser reflects upon a situation in which he was assisting with the formation 
of a company policy document. He caught himself questioning ‘hang on, why am I helping 
the company write this policy? You guys should be doing this. This is not my role. But at the 
same time I’m thinking no, this is my role too within this [HIP] environment’. (Union actor 
#24) Actors note that moving between different roles can have ‘exhaustive’ effects and can 
confuse members who might doubt their ‘integrity’ (Union actor #23). These new 
complexities comprise ongoing collective reflections among union teams.   
Managers similarly express features of a shift in conventional, or neo-liberal, 
managerialist role identity. Managers face normative pressures from the broader business 
environment of MNC management. These include common managerialist prerogative 
approaches popularized by US business schools over recent decades. A manager illustrates 
one of these international pressures in respect to personnel recruitment. ‘People come and say 
“what on earth are you doing?  Everybody else out there is beating up their unions …why 
don't you have a strategy that gets rid of your unions?” (Management actor #9). Those 
criticisms in some business circles require affected managers to navigate those pressures 
alongside pressures from other sceptics distrustful of the company’s and trade unions’ 
collaborative effort. Participatory management, they find, requires a more fluid and complex 
identity construction. Through their joint participation in HIP forums union actors similarly 
report their recognition of managers’ pressures from the wider international environment. A 
union leader notes that ‘most international management people don't operate in this 
paradigm, right?’ (Union actor #3). They are more cognisant and respectful of those pressures 
and aware of mutual responsibilities for collaborative relationships. 
In sum, the development of personnel qualities through drawing on moral resources 
enables them to see wider horizons of interests and strive to accommodate them. Cross-party 
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engagement in complex organizational processes, alongside personnel’s operational roles, 
draws on moral resources that in turn generate a new, collective moral capacity. The 
significant reforms and facilitation of new ways of working together across the organization 
are consolidating into positive co-dependencies. A breach of the agreement or failure of 
commitment to HIP would now constitute, as a manager put it, ‘a painful separation’. 
Discussion  
The achievements of the venture to forge institutional change toward a strategic 
partnership are recognized and welcomed by a majority of respondents. New institutions for 
regulating employment relations including con-joint forums for participation in significant 
decision-making have been established. These accomplishments are accompanied by similarly 
recognized persistent tensions and tough challenges. For some, the partnership remains more 
experimental than robustly established as the company’s now normal way of conducting its 
industrial relations and organizing its production processes. For others, ‘there is no going 
back to the bad old days’. Actors from all parties emphasise that the collaboration is not ‘a 
sort of nirvana’; it is a work in progress. The fragility of the venture, we propose, is 
nonetheless accompanied by revelation of significant potency for further capability building 
in forging collaborative relations. That potency, we propose, results from the social and moral 
capital that the partnership both draws on and generates through its concrete enactment. Its 
motif of ‘management and unions walking into the unknown together’, as a senior manager 
describes the living out of the partnership, has mobilized under-utilized resources and 
generated more complex competencies for economic and social utility in the company. 
Institutions are typically sticky and hard to change. Industrial relations institutions are 
likely especially prone to retentiveness (Crouch, 2014) as they entail multiple sets of norms, 
identities, and political histories. Some researchers contend that in regard to labour– 
management partnerships ‘the state, employers and unions remain locked into a status quo 
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that militates against sustainable mutuality’ (Dobbins and Dundon, 2017, p. 530). In addition, 
in liberal market economies partnership efforts ineluctably occur in conditions of intense 
international competitiveness. Their immense pressures prompt many to conclude that 
enlightened management and unions will not be enough to support partnerships (Delaney and 
Haworth, 2016; Kochan, 2008). Calls for stronger state regulation to support these 
undertakings are frequently made. That support should undoubtedly help. But even in a 
context of government encouragement of partnership relations, as occurs in New Zealand, the 
outcomes of any undertaking may ultimately be determined by the collective 
accomplishments of on-site actors. 
Kochan (2016) remarks that partnerships are prone to crisis and disappointment. A key 
factor in the resilience of the, to date, eighteen-year Kaiser-Permanente partnership has been 
the ability of multiple parties to apply the ‘tools of the partnership’ to address the challenges 
as they arise. Among those tools, Kochan (2016) suggests, are the skills and leadership of key 
actors. We contend that in addition to those resources of social capital, the ‘tools of 
partnership’ include generating and utilizing what we call moral capital. Moral capital 
includes toleration of ambiguity, uncertainty, and frustration; resources of patience, mutual 
respect, trust, sharing and openness. Our study demonstrates the effortful development of 
social-cognitive skills among cross-party personnel in negotiating the practicalities of the 
partnership. These capabilities are fostered through deliberate learning and training seminars 
for personnel (including all new recruits). Importantly, we stress, capacity is also being built 
through the activation of moral resources.  
Moral capital is a concept derived from Durkheimian sociology’s emphasis on social 
rules and normative regulation. It is similar to Bourdieu’s (1992) concepts of social and 
cultural capital, which refer to the ‘sum of resources’, in addition to economic capital, that 
individuals and groups accrue through their interaction in networks of relationships and 
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shared values. While Bourdieu regarded social capital as a powerful resource of elites, other 
theorists, notably Coleman (1988) and Field (2008), emphasise that diverse actors accrue and 
utilize social capital. In regard to economic relations, attention to the everyday deployment of 
social capital among people in market and workplace relations reveals the social 
embeddedness of economic action.  It also reveals the moral dimensions that are often ignored 
in economic analysis (Etzioni, 1988). 
Giddens (1991) and Sztompka (1999) respectively single-out trust for its vital role in 
all social relations. They theorize trust as a moral, value-laden, quality. Further philosophical 
and sociological discussion of trust is beyond our purposes here. Our sketch is intended to 
underscore the value of trust as a resource, and accomplishment. We propose, furthermore, 
that attention to trust’s cognate phenomena of patience, reciprocity, positive affect, and inter-
personal sharing may yield further insight into the construction and sustenance of partnership 
collaboration.  
This study reveals Company A’s initiation of the partnership undertaking arose from a 
more or less shared recognition among cross-party actors of the institutional fatigue of 
congealed adversarialism. The initiative for institutional innovation put in place clear 
structural arrangements for voice expression and skilled participation. They sought, implicitly, 
to enact a collaborative pluralism (Bray et al., 2015). The data reveals that the favourable new 
structures and conditions were welcome but insufficient to making it work. That requires the 
‘moral dimension’ (Etzioni, 1988) and moral resource application as we have elaborated. 
Much industrial and employment relations research has under-addressed the 
complexity of identities, interests, and moral aspirations of people at work. It has tended to 
assume, like much organizational research, that a moral economy and moral expression are 
quietly, invisibly woven into everyday organizational life. Deployment of moral capital ought 
to be expected of mature adults working in rational, purposive organizations. Yet it is in the 
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breach that the vitality and fragility of these resources is exposed. Legalistic HRM practices, 
unilateral managerial control and adversarial trade unions can be functional. But, as Company 
A’s partnership undertaking recognized from the outset, those routines can inhibit 
development of other qualities in organizational and employment life that generate a mutual 
socio-economic benefit in the longer run. 
A labour–management partnership in liberal market economies is conducted in a 
context of asymmetrical formal power relations. It is an ineluctably tensionful affair. It is 
therefore no surprise that mistrust, scepticism and uneven involvement are evident in this 
undertaking. What is noteworthy is that the partnership has also facilitated participatory 
power (Casey et al. 2016) that yields complex new capacities that alter formal dynamics and 
shift relationships toward a sophisticated collaboration. The development of socio-cognitive 
skills and activation of moral capital have created a local power to develop new shared norms 
and habits. The shaping and enactment of new shared norms generate capacities among 
company actors and unions to utilize human resources of sociality and cognitive and political 
skills to create a unique, particular partnership among themselves. They have created 
collective capacity to address problems and issues that the discussants have agreed to 
recognize and commit to resolution. 
These in turn have enabled some actors to shift identity attachments – to expand their 
more encamped identities. Skilled professional and trade employees in the application of their 
expertise to production and organizational tasks demonstrate their self-identities as not only 
that of employees with an employment relationship to be protected by their union. Their 
expression of expertise as organizational members stimulates an interest in organizational life 
and quality of their collective work. Managers similarly identify as organizational actors and 
employees alongside union actors. HIP processes of joint problem-solving and mutual 
recognition enable employees and managers to express a more complex identity and 
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multifaceted interests. Their organizational interests include but extend beyond the 
employment relationship and into the shaping of the organizational economy.  
A further point must be noted. The extensive involvement of external consultants and  
facilitators in capacity building indicates the ongoing need for support and development of 
key partnership behaviours. We observed that the neutral and mutually respected consultants 
play a considerable role in generating the multifaceted skills, competences, and qualities of 
partners. Their visibility in socio-cognitive skills is readily apparent. But they also foster the 
activation of moral capital through their encouragement, modelling, and careful inclusiveness.  
We recommend further close empirical research on these third party actors in partnership 
sustainability. 
Conclusion 
The significant programme of formal and normative institutional reform, and 
behavioural change on the part of company actors, managers, employees and unions, observed 
in this study is, after five years, still in its early days. The positive outcomes we identify are 
incremental and fragile. Robust embedding and normalisation throughout the organization 
remains to be achieved. The broadly welcome achievements, not least the cessation of 
adversarial dispute, attrition of some tenacious misconceptions among the various key parties, 
and sustained pursuit of the aspirations of partnership, are accompanied by significant 
challenges. These problems pose risks of regression and failure with subsequent risk of longer 
term avoidance of socio-cultural innovation in employment and organizational relations. 
Nonetheless, the advances in participatory practices and actors’ persistent efforts to make 
them work in addressing workplace and employment issues indicate that the path to 
partnership as sophisticated and multifaceted collaboration in this company has opened. Firm 
strategic choice and actors’ moral action are significant.  
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Setting up and enacting HIP systems and forums has opened the arena of engagement. 
Along with voice expression in problem-solving, the processes enable interest adjudication 
and interest expansion. Their action produces new resources for productivity and quality of 
organizational life and behaviour. Reaching beyond conventional identities as employees, 
unionists, managers and executives toward discovery of shared interests, from productivity to 
quality of working life, poses a radical, new collaborative pluralism that accommodates shifts 
and nuances and multi-directional power relations. Skilled, collaborative actors can harness 
these currents to craft a democracy of responsibility for organizational life, and company 
governance. To draw on a Durkheimian understanding, partnership is a moral economy as 
much as it is a material one. It is locally, collectively generated and enacted. 
Partnership can be formally decreed but its enactment is a continual aspiration, a 
laborious craft toward political and social mutuality and recognition of plural interests. Its 
moral embedding in the organization and sustained legitimacy over time proposes, ultimately, 
responsible collaboration in all and highest levels of governance of the company. 
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